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RECENT CASE NOTES
Despite some loose language in a few of the Indiana cases, it is clear
that Indiana should be classified with the states adhering to the eastern
or narrow view. The leading Indiana case holds that a railroad right of
way condemned by a stone company, the use of which will be available
to the public as a common carrier, as well as to the stone company as
8
Quotations from other India private carrier, is devoted to a public use.
ana cases will shed more light upon the proposition. "There must be in
the general public (to have a public use) a right to the definite use of
the property; a right which the law compels the owner to give to the
general public and which is guarded and controlled by law. It is not
9
"To
enough that the general prosperity of the community is promoted."
make a use public it is not necessary that the whole community or any
large portion thereof actually participate in it, but only that a right
to its enjoyment exists in the general public."lo "It has been held by this
court that the test as to whether a use is a public one or private one is
not simply how many persons actually use the way condemned for the
purpose for which it was condemned, but whether the public has a right
to use it without discrimination."11
The holding of the Indiana court in the principal case is in conformity
with the decisions of the states followiag the eastern or narrow view.
The grant to a subway contractor of the right to lay a track in the
street for the transportation of dump cars was held invalid, as not for
a public use, the court reasoning that public use necessarily implies the
2
The grant by a municipality to a departright of use by the public.1
ment store of the right to construct a spur in the street connecting the
department store with the main line of the railroad is not for a public
use.13 And a spur track from a railroad to a private coal yard is not
a public use, and a grant to maintain such a track in a public street is
invalid.14 But if the switch spur to the private enterprise is or may be
15
utilized by others, it is a public use.
If, in the present case, the land desired to be taken was to be devoted
to a public use, the question would arise as to whether compensation would
have to be paid. But since the public had no right to use the track in
the principal case, it was for a private purpose-one which the municipality
had no power to authorize, and the decision of the court is correct.
R. 0. E.
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DEATH-On

March 1, 1927, John Donnan, by complete and irrevocable gift inter Vivos,
transferred, without consideration, certain securities to trustees for his
W estport Stone Co. v. Thomas (1910), 175 Ind. 342, 94 N. E. 406.
Great Western Natural Gas and Oil Co. v. Hawkins (1903), 30 Ind. App. 557,
66 N. E. 765.
173 Ind. 342, 90 N. E. 474.
" Sexauer' v. Star Milling Co. (1909),
175 Ind. 342, 84 N. .. 406.
' Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas (1910),
12
Bradley v. Degnon (1918), 224 N. Y. 60, 120 N. E. 89.
2
Hatfield v. Straus (1907), 189 X. Y. 208, 82 N. E. 172.
It Mester v. Morman (1924), 227 Mich. 364, 198 N. W. 927; Butler v. F. B. Penn
Co. (1910), 152 N. C. 416, 68 S. E. 12.
"3Bedford Quarries Co. v. Chicago, etc., By. (1910), 175 Ind. 303, 94 N. E. 326.
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four children, and advanced a sum of money to his son. Donnan died
less than two years later. A tax was, accordingly, imposed under the
provision of the Federal Revenue Act which provides that such transfers,
made within two years prior to the death of the donor shall "be deemed
and held to have been made in contemplation of death."' Donnan's executors paid this tax under protest, and then sued to recover the amount
of the tax attributable to the property so given and so advanced. The
trial court found that neither the transfer nor the advancement was made
in contemplation of death. The question involved is whether or not the
provision of the tax creating a conclusive presumption that transfers
made within two years prior to death are made in contemplation thereof,
is constitutional. Held, in a majority opinion written by Mr. Justice
Sutherland, that the provision in question is unconstitutional because it
violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.2
The majority reasoned that the tax here is a death transfer tax laid
on property shown not to have been transferred in contemplation of
death. Complete title to said property had passed to the donee during the
lifetime of the donor, and yet the tax laid, not on the transfer of the
gift, or in respect of its value, but on the transfer of the estate of the
decedent-the value of which estate is enhanced by the fictitious inclusion
of the gift, and the estate made liable for a tax computed on that value.
The result is that the burden of a tax measured in part by property
which comprises no part of the estate is imposed upon those who succeeded to said estate. Plainly, Justice Sutherland says, this is measuring
the tax on A's property by imputing to it the value of B's property,
and so is contrary to due process of law.3 The majority opinion concluded with the statement that the tax could not be upheld as a gift
tax in view of the provisions of the statute that the value of the property
transferred shall be determined as of the time of death, without regard
to its value at the time of the transfer; and the fact that the ax falls
upon the decedent's estate and not upon the gift, and is computed not upon
the value of the gift, but by progressively graduated percentages upon
the value of the entire estate.
The minority opinion, written by Justice Stone, views the situation
from the practical viewpoint of the necessity of taxing these gifts without
encountering the administrative difficulties of providing the donor's intent. The dissent reasons that in taxing gifts inter irvos as though they
were legacies, it can be of no consequence whether the enactment says
that all gifts within two years of the death of the donor are irrebuttably
presumed to be in contemplation of death, or whether more directly, it
imposes the tax on all gifts made within two years of the donor's death.
In either case, the question is as to the power of the legislature so to
tax, and not as the particular choice of words by which the legislature
has expressed its purpose. The question is whether Congress has the
power to supplement an estate tax by a tax on gifts made within two years
of the donor's death at the same rate and in the same manner as though
the gifts were made at death.
'No. 302 (c) of the Revenue Act, Ch. 27, 44 Stat. at L. 9, 70.
'Heiner v. Donnan (1922), 52 Sp. Ct. 358, affirming 48 Fed. (2) 1058.
SKowlton v. Moore (1900), 178 U. S. 41; Schl inger v. Wisconsgin (1926), 270
U. G. 230; Hoeper v. Tax Com. of Wisconsin (1931), 52 Supreme Ct Rep. 120.
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It would seem that the fact that gifts made shortly before death,
regardless of motive, chiefly contribute to the withdrawal of property
from the operation of the estate tax is enough to justify the selection
of this class of gifts for taxation. The Supreme Court has held that the
due process clause does not forbid the selection of subjects for one form
of taxation for the reason that they may not be effectively reached by
another tax which it is the legislative policy to maintain. 4 Such is the
object here-to protect the revenue to be derived from the estate taxand it is not imperative that the motive of the donor be made the exclusive basis of the selection of these gifts for taxation. Further, the
Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to select certain
gifts to be taxed as estates are taxed, even though the title to the gifts
taxed was not transferred by the death-as in the case of a tax on the
value of property held by the decedent and another as tenants by the
entirety.5 The only requisite is, to quote the language of the court
in Tyler v. United States, "where the attempt and legitimate aim of
Congress is to prevent an avoidance of the estate tax by this method of
distribution-and the provision under review is an adjunct of the general
scheme of taxation of which it is a part, it is entirely appropriate as
a means to that end." Here, the gifts taxed may have no relation to the
death, but they are directly connected with the policy of taxing the
estates of decedents at death, for which would otherwise be taxed is, by
the gift, withdrawn from the operation of the tax unless the act which
impairs it-the giving away of property inter vivos-is itself taxed.
The history of litigation over gifts made in contemplation of death shows
that this tax imposed on all gifts made within two years of death is
attached to a legitimate legislative object-that of preventing an enormous
revenue loss due to evasion of the estate tax by including in the estate tax
all gifts made within two years of death. The line had to be drawn somewhere, and Congress can not be held rigidly to a choice between taxing all
gifts or taxing none, regardless of the practical necessity of preventing
tax avoidance, and regardless of experience in administering the tax. The
very power to classify involves the power to distinguish differences in
degrees between those things which are near and those which are remote
from the object aimed at. 6
The facts in the present case are very similar to those present in the
case of Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, with the exception that in the Schiesinger
case, the statute provided for taxing all gifts made within siz years of
death as though they had been made in contemplation thereof. In that
case, the six-year period seemed too long, and the decision that the classification of gifts made within that period as gifts causa mortis was arbitrary
and contrary to due process of law is sustainable. But, as Justice Holmes
said in his dissent to the opinion in that case, "The law allows a penumbra
to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in order that the
'Watson v. New York (1920), 254 U. S. 122; Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 121.
5 Tyler v. United States (1930), 281 U. S. 497.
* Citizens Telephone Co. v. Fuller (1913), 229 U. S. 322.
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object may be secured. A typical instance is the prohibition of the sale of
non-intoxicating malt liquors to make effective a prohibition of the sale of
beer. When the means are not prohibited and are calculated to effect the
object, we ought not to inquire into the degree of necessity for resorting to
them. If the term here were six months instead of six years-I hardly
think that the power of the State to pass the law would be doubted, as
the difficulty of proof would warrant making the presumption absolute."
The two-year term provided for in the statute in question appears to be
a reasonable one, as evidenced by the number of large gifts made within
two years of the donor's death-and in view of the difficulty of proving
intent, and of the necessity for protecting the revenue to be derived from
the estate tax-the argument seems persuasive that the statute should
have been upheld.
L. J. H.
7Schlesinger v. Wisconsin (1926), 270 U. S. 230.

